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I. Introduction 
Widespread use of friends, relatives and acquaintances to search for jobs is a stylized 
fact (Rees, 1966; Granovetter, 1974, 1995; Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990; 
Montgomery, 1991; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Topa, 2001; Addison and Portugal, 
2002; Wahba and Zenou, 2005; Bentolila, Michelacci and Suárez, 2010; Pellizari, 2010). 
Personal contacts may convey information about job vacancies and recommend friends, 
relatives and acquaintances with similar personal characteristics as themselves to their 
employer. For employers, job referrals lower the search costs as well as the screening 
costs of applicants. 
But are all personal contacts equally useful for job referral? According to the strength-
of-weak-ties theory by Granovetter (1973) weak ties, defined as acquaintances, are more 
useful for receipt of non-redundant information about job vacancies than strong ties, 
defined as friends and relatives. The more weak ties, the more non-redundant information 
about job openings will the individual receive. More recent social network theories, 
including Montgomery (1994) and Calvo-Armengól and Jackson (2004), instead argue 
that it is the quality, not the quantity, of personal contacts which is of key importance for 
job referral. The higher the quality of personal contacts, the more useful the contacts are 
for job referral.  
An empirical analysis of whether weak ties and employed contacts are more 
productive in job search than strong ties and non-employed contacts requires self-
reported information on characteristics of personal contacts. I have collected this 
information as part of a survey conducted in Denmark from Feb. to Nov. 2006 among a 
random sample of around 1,000 natives and random samples of around 1,000 immigrants 
from Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. In order to avoid reverse causality, i.e. that employment 
increases the number and quality of personal contacts, I limit my sample to unemployed 
survey respondents. For this sample, I estimate the effect of the quantity and quality of 
strong and weak ties on the individual’s employment probability in Nov. 2006 or Nov. 
2007, using information on the individual’s employment status from administrative 
registers. For native and immigrant respondents alike, I find that respondents with a high 
employment rate of acquaintances are significantly more likely to find a job, after 
controlling for other personal characteristics and socio-economic characteristics of the 
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municipality of residence. By contrast, having strong ties with a high employment rate 
and many acquaintances does not affect the individual’s employment probability. 
If geographic proximity facilitates information flows, network effects may operate in 
the neighborhood of residence. Therefore, living in a neighborhood with more 
unemployment may reduce the job chances. If so, concentration of unemployed workers 
in certain neighborhoods increases employment inequality in society.3
Results from studies using observational data are consistent with neighborhood job 
referral, i.e. that individuals who live in the same or adjacent neighborhoods sometimes 
refer each other to jobs.4 By contrast, the quasi-experimental studies by Oreopoulos 
(2003) and Jacob (2004) find little role of neighborhood quality. Oreopoulos (2003) takes 
account of location sorting by exploiting quasi-random assignment of families to 
different residential housing projects in Toronto at the time at which their family reached 
the top of the waiting list. Jacob (2004) addresses location sorting by exploiting public 
housing demolitions in Chicago that forced families to leave high-rise public housing. 
Both studies convincingly solve the fundamental methodological challenge of self-
selection into neighborhoods. However, their findings of a zero effect of neighborhood 
quality may be due to lack of variation in neighborhood quality. 
I argue that the Danish Spatial Dispersal on Refugees which operated from 1986 until 
1998 is an ideal quasi-experiment for investigation of whether living in a neighborhood 
with more unemployment is detrimental to individual labor market outcomes. At the time 
of receipt of asylum, placement officers working in the central office of the Danish 
Refugee Council assigned refugee families to housing in different locations in Denmark, 
exclusively on the basis of a questionnaire with personal information like household size. 
The placement officers did not meet face to face with refugees at the time of assignment. 
Since I observe all personal characteristics known to the placement officers in the 
administrative registers used for the analysis, I am able to condition on them in the 
regressions. As a consequence, characteristics of the neighborhood of assignment can be 
regarded as exogenous in the regressions.  
3 See e.g. Montgomery (1994). 
4 See e.g. Topa (2001), Weinberg, Reagan and Yankow (2004), Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008), Andersson, 
Burgess and Lane (2009) and Hellerstein, McInerney and Neumark (2011). 
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Moreover, recently neighborhood of residence data for Denmark was constructed by 
clustering all inhabited hectare cells into 2,296 neighborhoods, on average inhabited by 
2,343 persons in 2004.5 The approximately 15,400 refugee men subjected to the spatial 
dispersal policy were assigned to as many as 1,710 different neighborhoods located in 
245 different municipalities6 which gives me an extensive geographic variation in 
neighborhood characteristics. For instance, 16.7% of refugee men were quasi-randomly 
assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood defined as a neighborhood if the 
employment rate of the working-age population (18-60-year-olds) does not exceed 60%, 
while the remaining share was assigned to neighborhoods with less unemployment.7
Moreover, since the spatial dispersal policy was carried out for more than a decade, I can 
include municipality of assignment fixed effects to control for unobserved, time-invariant 
municipality characteristics.   
Six years after immigration as many as 35.2% of refugee men live in a socially 
deprived neighborhood. Controlling for personal characteristics, socio-economic 
characteristics of the municipality of residence and municipality fixed effects, they have a 
4.5 percentage points lower employment probability and 10% lower real annual earnings 
than refugee men living in non-deprived neighborhoods. However, assignment to a 
socially deprived neighborhood has a zero effect on the employment probability and real 
annual earnings of refugee men 2-6 years after assignment. Using assignment to a 
socially deprived neighborhood as instrument for living in a socially deprived 
neighborhood 2-6 years after assignment, I find that a zero effect of current residence in a 
socially deprived neighborhood on individual labor market outcomes. I conclude that the 
worse labor market outcomes of immigrants who live in a socially deprived 
neighborhood are entirely due to negative self-selection of immigrants into socially 
deprived neighborhoods. 
However, 74.7% of immigrant survey respondents who found their latest job through 
their social network found it through other immigrants. This suggests that non-Western 
5 In 2005, Anna P. Damm and Marie L. Schultz-Nielsen constructed neighborhoods for Denmark in 
collaboration with the Rockwool Research Unit. See Damm and Schultz-Nielsen (2008) for a description of 
the clustering process. 
6 In the observation period, Denmark was divided into 275 municipalities (local authorities), on average 
inhabited by 19,562 individuals (in 2004).   
7 In 2004, 4.1% of the overall population and 24% of non-Western immigrants in Denmark lived in a 
socially deprived neighborhood. 
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immigrants mainly have contact with neighbors of similar ethnic origin and limited 
contact with native neighbors. In that case, what matters is not the employment rate of the 
general population in the neighborhood, but the employment rate of immigrants of 
similar ethnic origin.8 To test this hypothesis, I instrument the employment rate of non-
Western immigrant (or co-national) men living in the current neighborhood of residence 
by the employment rate of non-Western immigrant (or co-national) men living in the 
neighborhood of assignment in the year of assignment. I find that a percentage point 
increase (around the mean) in the employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 
18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration increases the 
individual’s employment probability by 0.2 percentage points and real annual earnings by 
2%. In addition, I find that one percentage point increase in the employment rate of co-
national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after 
immigration (around the mean) increases real annual earnings by 2%. These results are 
robust to controlling for the quantity of non-Western immigrant (co-national) men living 
in the neighborhood of residence. 
The next section gives a brief literature review. Section III presents survey evidence 
on job search channels in Denmark and investigates whether and how the social network 
promotes individual employment. Section IV describes the Danish Spatial Dispersal 
Policy on Refugees and exploits it to provide quasi-experimental evidence on whether 
settlement in a neighborhood with more unemployment hampers individual labor market 
outcomes. Section V offers conclusions. 
II. Literature review
Social network theories emphasize the importance of different characteristics of the 
social network for job referral, e.g. strong versus weak ties and the quality versus the 
quantity of contacts.  
According to the strength-of-weak-ties theory by Granovetter (1973), the degree of 
overlap of two individuals’ friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their 
tie to one another. If the two individuals are acquaintances (rather than close friends), 
there is little overlap in their networks. Such weak ties are more likely to convey non-
8 This intuition is consistent with the theoretical model by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004). 
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redundant information about job vacancies and therefore more useful for obtaining a job 
than strong ties, defined as family and close friends.  
The quasi-experimental papers on the effect of living in an ethnic enclave on 
immigrant labor market outcomes by Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund (2003) and Damm 
(2009) emphasize the importance of having many weak ties. Edin et al. (2003) exploit a 
Swedish Spatial Dispersal Policy on refugees to estimate the earnings effect of the 
number of co-nationals living in the municipality of residence 8 years after immigration. 
As instrument they use the number of co-nationals in the municipality of assignment and 
municipality of assignment fixed effects are included to control for time-invariant 
municipality characteristics. They find a positive earnings effect of the number of co-
nationals living in the municipality of residence for low-skilled refugees, while the effect 
is insignificant for highly skilled refugees. Using the Danish Spatial Dispersal Policy on 
refugees in place from 1986 until 1998, Damm (2009) finds a positive effect of the 
number of co-nationals living in the municipality of residence 7 years after immigration 
on individual real annual earnings, for both low- and highly skilled refugees. As 
instrument Damm (2009) uses the number of co-nationals assigned together with 
individual i to municipality j. A likely explanation is that co-ethnic contacts convey 
valuable information about better-paying jobs. 
More recent social network theories by Montgomery (1994) and Calvó-Armengol and 
Jackson (2004) argue that the quality of contacts matter for job referral. Montgomery 
(1994) models the impact of social interaction on employment transitions and inequality 
in a way that links the notion of strong versus weak ties to the social structure. In his 
model, society is composed of many two-person groups. Each individual may be 
employed or not. Unemployed individuals find jobs through strong ties (intra-group 
interaction), weak ties (random intergroup interaction) and formal channels. Furthermore, 
the model assumes that social interactions are characterized by inbreeding bias, making 
the employment status of one’s strong tie critical. Montgomery uses his model to show 
that an increase in weak-tie interactions reduces employment inequality. Moreover, an 
increase in weak-tie interactions increases the steady-state employment rate if inbreeding 
by employment status among weak ties is sufficiently low. 
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Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) explore the implications of exogenous 
information networks by setting up a model where agents obtain information about job 
opportunities through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts. They show that 
employment is positively correlated across time and agents. Moreover, they examine 
inequality. If staying in the labor market is costly and one group (e.g. blacks versus 
whites) starts with a worse employment status, then that group’s drop-out rate will be 
higher and their employment prospects will be persistently below that of the other group. 
The empirical study by Munshi (2003) provides convincing evidence that, besides the 
number of contacts, the quality of contacts is also important. Munshi (2003) studies the 
effect of the size and vintage of the origin-community based networks of Mexican 
immigrants in the US on their employment probability and occupation category 
(agriculture or not). Using the amount of rainfall in the origin-community as an 
instrument for the size of the network in the destination and including individual fixed 
effects in the regressions to control for selective emigration, Munshi (2003) finds that the 
larger the established network is, the more likely the same individual is to be employed 
and hold a higher paying non-agricultural job. 
If geographic proximity facilitates information flows, network effects may operate in 
the neighborhood of residence. Previous empirical papers find contrasting evidence on 
whether the individuals who live in the same or adjacent neighborhoods refer each other 
to jobs.  
Using census tracts in Chicago, Topa (2001) estimates a structural model that 
explicitly incorporates local interactions. His model estimates show that high 
unemployment in one tract is associated with more unemployment in neighboring tracts 
that can be explained by the characteristics of the neighboring tracts alone. He interprets 
this as evidence of local spillover effects. Similarly, Andersson et al. (2009) find 
empirical evidence that immigrants living in census tracts with large numbers of 
employed neighbors are more likely to have jobs than immigrants in areas with fewer 
employed neighbors. Moreover, Bayer et al. (2008) show that people who live in the 
same census block tend to work together. They interpret this as evidence of neighborhood 
job referrals. Using a confidential version of NLSY79, Weinberg et al. (2004) estimate 
large effects of neighborhood social characteristics on labor market activity after 
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exploiting the panel aspects of their data and provide evidence of non-linear 
neighborhood effects: social influences have the greatest proportional effects in the worst 
neighborhoods. 
In contrast, the only quasi-experimental neighborhood effects studies to date, 
Oreopoulos (2003) and Jacob (2004), find little role of the neighborhood quality on 
individual achievement. Oreopoulos (2003) investigates whether neighborhood quality 
affects long-term labor market outcomes of individuals who were assigned as children to 
different residential housing projects in Toronto at the time at which their family reached 
the top of the waiting list. Assignment was based mainly on household size and families 
were unable to specify project preferences. Jacob (2004) argues that the public housing 
demolition in Chicago can be regarded as a natural experiment which enables estimation 
of the intent-to-treat effect of public housing demolitions in Chicago and the average 
treatment effect of living in public housing on student achievement. Jacob (2004) show 
that the majority of households that leave high-rise public housing due to the demolitions 
move to neighborhoods that are similar to those they left. Therefore, his finding of a zero 
effect of neighborhood quality can be explained by lack of neighborhood quality 
variation. 
For an extensive summary of the economic literature on job information networks and 
neighborhood effects, see Ioannides and Loury (2004). 
III. The importance of the social network for job finding
III.A Data 
The primary data source is the Welfare Research Survey data collected by SFI Survey 
in Feb.-Nov. 2006 in Denmark for a random sample of roughly 4,000 18-45-year-old 
individuals - around 1,000 natives and 1,000 immigrants (i.e. foreign born individuals 
whose parents are also foreign born or have foreign citizenship) from each of the 
following countries: Turkey, Iran or Pakistan.9 The overall response rate was 60%.10 The 
9 Immigration from Turkey and Pakistan began in the late 1960s and the early 1970s with immigration of 
unskilled men (”guest workers”) who found employment in the Danish manufacturing industry. Many 
guest workers subsequently brought their families to Denmark and many of their children have found their 
spouse in the country of origin and brought them to Denmark. Immigration from Iran began in the mid 
8
Welfare Research Survey is a cross-sectional micro data set for 2006. The data collection 
process consisted of telephone interviews supplemented by face-to-face interviews. If 
possible, the interview was conducted in Danish and otherwise in Turkish, Farsi or Urdu. 
Therefore, insufficient host-country language skills were not a barrier for participation. 
Using a unique person identifier, I link the Welfare Research Survey with administrative 
register information from Statistics Denmark on the individual’s demographic 
characteristics and educational attainment in 2006, employment status in Nov. 2006 and 
Nov. 2007 as well as information on work experience from 1980 until 2004 (measured in 
number of years of full-time work).11 In addition, I add socio-economic characteristics of 
the individual’s municipality of residence in 2006 to the Welfare Research Survey. The 
information on municipality characteristics has been constructed from the administrative 
registers by Statistics Denmark. Table 1.A summarizes the personal attributes and the 
municipality of residence characteristics of survey respondents separately for natives 
(column 1) and immigrants (column 2). Survey respondents are on average 33.5 years 
old. While immigrant and native respondents are similar in terms of age, immigrant 
survey respondents are significantly more likely to be married, are significantly less 
likely to have completed more than nine years of education, have significantly fewer 
years of work experience in Denmark and are significantly less likely to be employed in 
Nov. 2006 or Nov. 2007.   
In the Welfare Research Survey labor force participants were asked about their means 
of finding their latest (employee) job. Table 2 summarizes the results. As reported in 
Panel A of Table 2 (columns 1-2), the majority of natives (71%) and immigrants (67%) 
had found their latest job by means of direct job search. The most common direct job 
search channel was “direct application to the employer”; that channel was used by 44% 
of the respondents who found their latest job through direct search (see Panel B of Table 
1980s, when a large number of asylum seekers received a residence permit in Denmark. (Mogensen and 
Mathiessen 2002). 
10 Deding, Fridberg and Jakobsen (2008) have carefully examined determinants of non-response in the 
survey by linking the survey with administrative registers. The findings are that immigrants from Pakistan 
were especially difficult to contact, while refusals were high among Turkish immigrants. Moreover, they 
conclude that individuals aged 18-29, individuals with children and women were significantly easier to 
contact, while highly educated and employed individuals were more likely to cooperate.
11 The Rockwool Research Unit has granted me access to their administrative register information from 
Statistics Denmark.  
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2, columns 1-2). However, a substantial share of respondents had found their latest job by 
means of informal job search, i.e. through the social network (relatives, close friends or 
acquaintances): 16.6% of natives and 26.3% of immigrants survey respondents. These 
findings are in line with two previous Danish surveys which were conducted by the 
Rockwool Research Unit in 1996 for the general population and in 1998-1999 for the 
immigrant population. According to these two surveys, 19% of native workers and 23% 
of immigrant workers had found their current job through friends, relatives or other 
acquaintances or the union (Mogensen and Mathiessen, 2000). Compared to evidence for 
most other European countries and the U.S., the share of workers in Denmark who has 
found the latest job through the social network is rather low. A possible explanation may 
well be that formal job search channels are relatively efficient in Denmark, as argued by 
Pellazari (2010). Furthermore, division of immigrant respondents into low- and highly 
skilled (defined as having completed at least nine years of school) shows that a higher 
share of low-skilled immigrants have found the latest job through their social network: 
36% as opposed to 23.3% of highly skilled (see columns 3-4 in Table 2). 
I have obtained information about the quality of the social network by asking the 
following survey questions which I use as measures of the usefulness of the social 
network for job referral. First: “Do few or many of your i) family members in Denmark, 
ii) close friends in Denmark and iii) other adult contacts have a job?” Second: “Which 
level of education does most of your i) family members in Denmark, ii) close friends in 
Denmark and iii) other adult contacts have?” If at least 50% of members of a given social 
network category are employed, the indicator for having a social network with a high 
employment rate takes the value 1, 0 otherwise. Similarly, if at least 50% of members of 
a given social network category have either vocational secondary education or tertiary 
education, the indicator for having a highly educated (i.e. skilled) social network takes 
the value 1, 0 otherwise.
I construct variables for the individual’s work attitude and the work attitude of strong 
ties (family and close friends in Denmark) from the answers to the following survey 
questions: First: “To which extent do i) you, ii) most of your family members in Denmark 
and iii) most of your close friends in Denmark agree with the statement that unemployed 
individuals ought to be willing to move in order to get a permanent job?” Second: “To 
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which extent do i) you, ii) most of your family members in Denmark and iii) close friends 
in Denmark agree with the statement that unemployed individuals ought to be willing to 
take a job at a salary below the income as unemployed?” Third: “to which extent do i) 
you, ii) most of your family members in Denmark and iii) close friends in Denmark agree 
with the statement that it is humiliating to receive social assistance?” 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.B summarize the self-reported individual characteristics 
including social network characteristics for native and immigrant survey respondents, 
respectively. Significant mean differences exist in self-reported social network 
characteristics between native and immigrant respondents. At the time of the interview, 
natives had a higher employment rate than immigrants. On average natives have more 
acquaintances in the host-country than immigrants and a larger share of natives has a 
social network with a high employment rate and high level of education than immigrants. 
This may be evidence that job seekers with many acquaintances and a social network 
with a high employment rate and high level of education increase the chances of getting a 
job. Alternatively, it may reflect reverse causality, i.e. employed individuals get more 
acquaintances and more employed acquaintances through their job, and that friendships 
tend to form within skill groups. The two groups of respondents also differ significantly 
when it comes to work attitudes. Turning to work attitudes of the respondents, a larger 
share of immigrant respondents than Danish respondents agree with the views that i) “I 
primarily work to earn a living” and ii) “unemployed individuals should be willing to 
move to get a permanent job”, iii) “Unemployed individuals ought to be willing to work 
at a salary below the income as unemployed” and iv) “it is humiliating to receive social 
assistance”. Agreeing with these statements may be interpreted as evidence of a strong 
work ethic. If so, the immigrant respondents on average have a stronger work ethic than 
Danish respondents. However, a smaller share of immigrant than native respondents has 
family in Denmark who agrees with the above-mentioned views ii)-iii), suggesting that 
the work ethic of family of immigrant respondents is weaker than that of Danish 
respondents. 
III.B Empirical model 
In order to avoid reverse causality (i.e. that having a job may increase the size and 
improve the quality of your social network), I limit my sample to survey respondents who 
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did not have a job in the week before the interview (conducted from Feb. to Nov. 2006) 
but was looking for one, henceforth referred to as the sample of unemployed respondents. 
The Danish labor market was extremely tight in 2006; the (net) unemployment rate in 
full-time equivalents was 3.9% (www.statistikbanken.dk/AULAAR). Therefore, only 69 
native survey respondents and 239 survey respondents of immigrant origin were 
unemployed in the week before the interview. The dependent variable is an indicator for 
being employed in Nov. 2006 or Nov. 2007 according to the administrative registers. 
Among unemployed survey respondents 65% of natives sand 49% of immigrants were 
employed in Nov. 2006 or Nov. 2007, which means that they have found a job shortly 
after the interview.  
I investigate the importance of characteristics of the individual’s social network on job 
finding for the sample of unemployed respondents in the following way. First, I evaluate 
how much inclusion of social network explanatory variables increases the explanatory 
power of the standard model with personal and area of residence attributes as 
employment determinants. Henceforth, I refer to the extended employment model as the 
social network model. Second, I use the estimated social network model to find out 
which, if any, social network characteristics have a significant effect on the individual’s 
employment probability. The social network model is given by 
(1) 
ݕ௜௝ ൌ ௜ܹߜ ൅ ܺ௜ߚ ൅ ௝ܸߛ ൅ ߝ௜௝
where subscript i denotes the individual and subscript j denotes the municipality of 
residence. The dependent variable y takes the value 1 if individual i is employed in Nov. 
2006 or Nov. 2007, 0 otherwise. W is the set of self-reported social network 
characteristics. The standard set of explanatory variables is X: personal attributes and V:
socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality of residence. İ is the error term. Values 
of explanatory variables refer to 2006. 
W contains variables describing i) the size of the individual’s social network, ii) the 
quality of strong (family and close friends in Denmark) and weak ties (other contacts in 
Denmark, henceforth referred to as acquaintances in Denmark), iii) predominant contact 
to other immigrants, iv) the individual’s own work ethic and v) the work ethic of family 
in Denmark. 
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For natives, X consists of indicators for sex, marital status, having a child aged 0-2, 
having a child aged 3-17, educational attainment (0-9 years, 10-12 years, 13 years or 
more) and being proficient in English, work experience, work experience squared and 
interactions between gender and indicators for i) marital status, ii) having a child aged 0-
2 and iii) having a child aged 3-17. For immigrants, X contains in addition age, age 
squared and indicators for being proficient in Danish, year of immigration, country of 
origin and reason for immigration. V contains three variables: log number of inhabitants, 
log average annual gross income and the unemployment rate in the municipality of 
residence.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show the summary statistics for the sample of 
unemployed respondents separately for natives and immigrants. 
III.C Empirical results 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the standard employment model for 
unemployed survey respondents separately for natives (first column) and immigrants 
(fifth column). The standard employment model explains, respectively, 0.213 and 0.29 of 
the total variation in employment status in Nov. 2006/2007. For immigrants, Danish and 
English language proficiency are, respectively, associated with 17 percentage points (or 
35%) and 29 percentage points (or 59%) higher employment probability. However, these 
estimates are likely to be upward biased due to omitted variables like innate abilities. 
Next, I include self-reported social network characteristics and own work attitude as 
additional explanatory variables. I use three different specifications of the social network 
model for natives and four different specifications for immigrants. The first specification 
includes two types of social network characteristics as explanatory variables: i) the 
number of acquaintances (standardized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of 1), 
ii) the quality of strong and weak ties (indicators for having family, close friends and 
acquaintances in Denmark of which the majority are highly educated and employed). The 
second specification also includes the interaction between the number of acquaintances 
and an indicator for having acquaintances of which the majority are employed. The third 
specification for immigrants includes in addition to the first specification an indicator for 
having predominant contact to other immigrants and the interaction between the number 
of acquaintances and the indicator for having predominant contact to other immigrants. 
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The final specification for both natives and immigrants includes, in addition to the 
second-to-last specification for the respective group, explanatory variables describing i) 
the individual’s own work ethic and ii) the work ethic of family in Denmark.12
The estimation results of the different specifications of the social network model are 
also reported in Table 3 (columns 2-4 for natives, columns 6-9 for immigrants). Inclusion 
of social network characteristics which measure the size and quality of the individual’s 
social network increases the explained part of the variance from 0.213 to 0.300 for 
natives and from 0.290 to 0.336 for immigrants. Additional inclusion of work ethic 
variables increases the explanatory power of the model from 0.300 to 0.400 for natives 
and from 0.319 to 0.358 for immigrants. 
For natives and immigrants alike and in all specifications, the number of 
acquaintances has an insignificant effect on the individual’s employment probability, 
while having acquaintances of which the majority are employed promotes employment. 
Having acquaintances of which the majority is employed is associated with 49 percentage 
points (or 75%) and 12 percentage points (or 24%) higher employment probability for 
natives and immigrants, respectively. However, these estimates are likely to be upward 
biased due to omitted variables like innate abilities. The quality of strong ties (family and 
close friends) has an insignificant effect on the individual’s employment probability.13
For immigrants, I also find that having primarily immigrant acquaintances is associated 
with 13 percentage points (or 27%) lower employment probability. However, note that 
the estimate may be biased due to lack of control for unobserved individual abilities and 
read Section IV.D for an estimate of the causal effect of exposure to non-Western 
immigrants living in the neighborhood on labor market outcomes of non-Western 
immigrant men. 
For natives and immigrants alike, the work ethic of family in Denmark does not 
influence the individual’s employment probability. Similarly, with one exception, all 
12 Measures of the work ethic of close friends in Denmark are excluded from the set of explanatory 
variables because of a high correlation between the work ethic of family in Denmark and of close friends in 
Denmark. 
13 The exception is that immigrants with family members in Denmark of which at least half are employed 
have a significantly lower employment probability (at the ten percent significance level). However, this 
counter-intuitive result is driven by female respondents; the estimate turns insignificant after inclusion of 
the interaction between an indicator for woman and the indicator for having family members in Denmark of 
which at least half are employed.   
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measures of own work ethic have an insignificant effect on the individual’s employment 
probability.14 This suggests that either work attitudes have little influence on the 
individuals’ employment probability, or the self-reported work attitudes are not reliable 
measures. 
Summing up, estimation results for the social network model reported in Table 3 show 
that one social network characteristic is important for job finding of natives and 
immigrants alike: having acquaintances of which the majority is employed. If individuals 
are sometimes referred to vacant jobs through contacts in their neighborhood, this finding 
suggests that residents in socially deprived neighborhoods (i.e. neighborhoods with a 
high concentration of jobless individuals) may have a lower employment probability than 
residents outside socially deprived neighborhoods, in part because they have fewer 
employed contacts in the neighborhood. I now turn to empirical investigation of this 
hypothesis. 
IV. The causal effect of living in a socially deprived 
neighborhood on individual labor market outcomes 
This section exploits a quasi-experiment to investigate empirically whether residence in a 
socially deprived neighborhood hampers individual labor market outcomes or whether 
the adverse labor market outcomes of residents in socially deprived neighborhoods are 
entirely due to negative self-selection of individuals into these neighborhoods. 
IV.A Data 
I link two primary data sources using a unique person identifier: i) administrative register 
data from Statistics Denmark 1986-2004 and ii) neighborhood of residence information 
from the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit for the entire population in Denmark 
1985-2004. The neighborhoods are constructed on basis of geo-referenced data provided 
by the National Square Grid – Denmark. The 431,233 inhabited hectare cells in Denmark 
are clustered into 2,296 neighborhoods, on average inhabited by 2,343 persons in 2004. 
The neighborhoods are homogenous in terms of population size and housing type and 
14 The exception is that natives who agree with the view that “unemployed individuals should be willing to 
move to get a permanent job” have a lower employment probability – in contrast to what one would expect. 
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delineated by physical barriers (like major roads, lakes and forests) (Damm and Schultz-
Nielsen, 2008). 
Previous Danish studies have defined a socially deprived neighborhood as a 
neighborhood in which more than 40% of the working-age population receive public 
income transfers or the non-Western immigrant share exceeds 30% (Andersen, 2005; 
Damm, Schultz-Nielsen and Tranæs, 2006). Using this definition, 90 out of 2,296 
neighborhoods were socially deprived in 2004. Damm et al. (2006) show that the mean 
gross income is relatively low and the share of inhabitants who have committed a crime 
is relatively high in socially deprived neighborhoods. However, social network theory 
argues that what matters for individual labor market outcomes is whether or not a 
neighbor is employed and not whether or not the neighbor receives public income 
transfers. Therefore, I define a neighborhood as socially deprived if the employment rate 
in the working-age population (ages 18-60) does not exceed 60%. This definition is 
equivalent to defining a socially deprived neighborhood as a neighborhood in which the 
jobless share of the working age population exceeds 40%. According to my definition, 
119 out of 2,296 neighborhoods were socially deprived in 2004.15 4.1% of the overall 
population in Denmark lived in a socially deprived neighborhood in 2004. By contrast, 
24% of non-Western immigrants lived in a socially deprived neighborhood. Note also 
that in Nov. 2004, only 60% of non-Western immigrants in Denmark were employed 
while 82.8% of the overall population were employed. 
Ideally, estimation of the causal effect of living in a socially deprived neighborhood 
on individual labor market outcomes requires random assignment of individuals to the 
two types of neighborhoods, socially deprived and non-deprived. Below I argue that such 
an experiment has been undertaken for newly recognized refugees who were subject to 
the ordinary Spatial Dispersal Policy on Refugees in Denmark in the period 1986-1998. 
Therefore, for this part of the analysis I extract a longitudinal panel of all male non-
Western immigrants aged 18-59 who immigrated in the period 1986-1998 from one of 
the eight largest refugee-sending countries (Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, Somalia, 
15 Defining in addition a neighborhood as socially deprived if the non-Western immigrant share exceeds 
30% would not add any neighborhoods to the set of socially deprived neighborhoods in the period 1986-
1996, i.e. the period in which newly recognized refugees were subject to the Danish Spatial Dispersal 
Policy. They are already defined as socially deprived according to my definition. 
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Vietnam, Afghanistan and Ethiopia).16 Refugees from these countries constitute more 
than 86% of the total number of permanent residence permits granted to refugees 
between 1985 and 1997.17 I exclude family-reunified immigrants by excluding 
individuals if i) they were married to an individual from a non-refugee-sending country 
or ii) immigrated more than a year later than the spouse. These selection criteria result in 
a balanced sample of 15,436 male refugees who are observed annually until six years 
after immigration. 
Using a unique personal identifier, I link the information about the neighborhood of 
assignment (defined as the neighborhood of residence in the year of immigration) with 
the longitudinal panel of male refugees. Moreover, I link the longitudinal panel of male 
refugees with socio-economic characteristics of the municipality of assignment (defined 
as the municipality of residence in the year of immigration). Summary statistics (initial 
values) of the balanced sample of male refugees are shown in appendix Table A1.  
Six years after immigration 35.2% of male refugees live in a socially deprived 
neighborhood; their employment rate is only 24.8% while 33.8% of refugee men living in 
a non-deprived neighborhood are employed. This difference may simply reflect observed 
differences in personal and area characteristics. To investigate whether this is the case, I 
estimate 
(2)       
࢟࢏࢐࢑ሺ࢚ା૟ሻ ൌ ࢻࡰ࢏࢐࢑ሺ࢚ା૟ሻ ൅ ࢄ࢏࢚ࢼ ൅ ࢂ࢐כࢽ ൅ ࢾ࢑ ൅ ࢾ࢚ ൅ ࢾ࢐כ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢐࢑ሺ࢚ା૟ሻ
where the subscripts denote i: individual, j: municipality of residence, k: country of 
origin, t: year of assignment (i.e. year of immigration), j*: municipality of assignment. 
The dependent variable y is either a dummy variable for individual i living in 
municipality j in year t+6 being employed in year t+6 or the individual’s log real annual 
earnings in year t+6. The key explanatory variable is a dummy D which takes the value 1 
16 Refugees from Former Yugoslavia are excluded from my sample because – in contrast to refugees from 
other refugee-sending countries – they were initially granted provisional asylum and were therefore subject 
to a special dispersal policy of refugees implemented in 1993 (called the Bosnian program). Refugees 
subject to the Bosnian program were accommodated in refugee-reception centres and so-called refugee 
villages. 
17 For these groups, the number of non-refugee immigrants relative to the total number of immigrants (after 
exclusion of immigrants who were married to a resident in Denmark from a non-refugee sending country in 
the year of immigration) is less than 4.8%. 
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if individual i lived in a socially deprived neighborhood in municipality j in year t+6, 0 
otherwise. Control variables are X: personal attributes in year t (age and age squared and 
indicators for marital status, having a young child, having an old child and educational 
attainment), V: socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the municipality of 
assignment (log number of inhabitants, log average gross income, the unemployment 
rate, log percentage of non-Western immigrants, and log percentage of co-nationals) and 
į: fixed effects for country of origin, year of assignment and – in specification 2 – also 
for municipality of assignment. İ is the error term. 
Using the two different specifications, the estimated correlations between living in a 
socially deprived neighborhood six years after immigration and individual labor market 
outcomes six years after immigration for the overall sample are reported in Table 4 
(columns 1-2: employment model, columns 7-8: earnings model). Refugees who live in a 
socially deprived neighborhood six years after immigration have a 4.5 pct. points lower 
employment rate and 9.5-10.1 percent lower real annual earnings than refugees who live 
elsewhere, after controlling for initial values of personal attributes, socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of the municipality of assignment in the year of immigration, 
year of immigration, country of origin, and – in specification 2 also - municipality of 
assignment. Furthermore, I investigate whether refugees who live in a socially deprived 
neighborhood six years after immigration have worse labor market outcomes irrespective 
of skill level by estimating equation 2 separately for low- and highly skilled (i.e. at least 
10 years of schooling) men. These coefficient estimates are also reported in Table 4 
(columns 3-6: employment model, columns 9-12: earnings model). Living in a socially 
deprived neighborhood six years after immigration is associated with a significantly 
lower employment probability for both skill groups and, for highly skilled refugees only, 
also with significantly lower real annual earnings. 
I will use instrumental variable techniques in order to test whether the negative 
statistical association between residence in a socially deprived neighborhood and 
individual labor market outcomes is a causal effect. In particular, I will instrument the 
indicator for current residence in a socially deprived neighborhood by an indicator for 
having been assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood as part of the Ordinary Spatial 
Dispersal Policy on Refugees. This instrument is valid if refugees subject to the Ordinary 
18
Spatial Dispersal Policy were randomly distributed across neighborhoods or, if at least, I 
can control for all personal attributes which affected the assignment to neighborhood 
type. Moreover, the instrument is a strong predictor if a substantial share of refugees 
remains in the neighborhood of assignment for some years. I now turn to a short 
description of the Ordinary Spatial Dispersal Policy on Refugees. 
IV.B Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees 
In 1986, the Danish Government, through the Danish Refugee Council (henceforth 
referred to as “the Council”), implemented a two-stage dispersal policy for asylum 
seekers who had their applications approved, i.e. refugees.18 The main objective was to 
disperse refugees across counties and municipalities according to the number of existing 
inhabitants.19 In a first step, the Council allocated refugees proportional to the number of 
inhabitants to counties; in a second step, and within counties, refugees were 
proportionally allocated to the number of inhabitants to municipalities (Danish Refugee 
Council, CIU, 1996, p. 8-9). This policy was in place until the end of 1998. Over this 
thirteen-year period, 76,673 individuals were granted refugee status (Statistical Yearbook 
1992, Table 60; Statistical Yearbook 1997, Table 68; Statistical Yearbook 2000, Table 
55) and were allocated across municipalities by the Council. 
Before approval of refugee status, asylum seekers lived in Red Cross Reception 
Centers spread across Denmark. About ten days after receipt of asylum, those who were 
granted refugee status were assigned to temporary housing in one of Denmark’s 15 
counties by the central Council office (Danish Refugee Council, CIU, 1996, p. 9). After 
settlement in the assigned county, the local office of the Council assisted assigned 
refugees in finding permanent housing in one of the municipalities within the county.  
At receipt of asylum, refugees needed to fill in a questionnaire, which was available 
to the Council when making the allocation decision. The questionnaire asked refugees to 
provide a few personal details: birth date, marital status, number of children, nationality, 
and language. Placement officers in the central Council office did not meet the refugees 
18 Until June 2002, Denmark gave asylum to individuals who were defined as refugees according to the 
Geneva Convention and to individuals who would not qualify as refugees under the Convention, but who 
for other reasons should not be required to return to the home country ('de facto' refugees - see Coleman 
and Wadensjö, 1999, for details). 
19 Following the convention, I refer to a person who seeks asylum as an “asylum seeker”, and to a person 
whose asylum status has been approved as a “refugee”. 
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in person; dispersal decisions were made exclusively on the basis of the questionnaire 
information. For instance, the information about household composition was used to 
determine whether to search for housing for a single individual or a family. Hence, the 
Council’s allocation may have been influenced by some of the information in the 
questionnaire, like family size. I observe all these characteristics in the analysis, and 
condition on them. By contrast, the Council’s allocation was not influenced by 
educational attainment or family income since the questionnaire did not ask about such 
personal details.   
Note that the Council did not consider individual location wishes in the assignment 
process. However, a small fraction of refugees refused the offer of permanent housing in 
the location of assignment in which case the Council reassigned them to another location. 
I define the neighborhood of assignment as the initial neighborhood of residence 
observed in the administrative registers, i.e. the neighborhoods of residence at the time of 
receipt of asylum. Re-assignment is only a minor concern for the instrumental variables 
analysis because, in the rare case of re-assignment, it typically took place after the initial 
move to the location of assignment, in which case the location of assignment is observed 
in the administrative registers. 
After settlement in the location of assignment, refugees participated in Danish 
language courses during an introductory period of 18 months while receiving social 
assistance. Although individuals were urged to stay in the assigned municipality during 
the entire introductory period, there were no relocation restrictions. Individuals could 
move away from the municipality of assignment at any time, if they could find alternative 
housing elsewhere. Receipt of social benefits was unconditional on residing in the 
municipality of assignment. 
The spatial dispersal policy was successful. Refugees who got asylum in the period 
1980-1984 primarily settled in one of the large cities (Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense and 
Aalborg) (see Figure 1). By contrast, refugees who got asylum in the period 1986-1998 
were fairly evenly distributed across municipalities relative to the local population size as 
shown in Figure 2. Moreover, the Council's Annual Report (Danish Refugee Council, 
1987, p. 30-31) shows that only two years after the introduction of the dispersal policy 
refugees lived in 243 out of the 275 municipalities. 
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Table 5 shows that the dispersal policy had a very visible effect on the settlement 
pattern across neighborhood type (socially deprived or non-deprived) of refugees. It 
shows the geographical distribution across neighborhood type of the overall population in 
Denmark and non-Western immigrants in 1991 and individuals in the balanced sample of 
refugee men. The non-Western immigrant population was heavily overrepresented in 
socially deprived neighborhoods in 1991. 22.8% of non-Western immigrants lived in 
such a neighborhood as compared to 3.9% of the overall population in Denmark. By 
contrast, as a consequence of the spatial dispersal policy on refugees, only 16.7% of 
individuals in the balanced sample of refugee men subject to the Ordinary Spatial 
Dispersal Policy on Refugees initially lived in a socially deprived neighborhood. 
Refugees were initially renters. However, as shown in appendix Table A1, refugee men 
assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood were initially overrepresented in large 
apartment blocks (88% vs. 42%) and public housing units (81% vs. 23%).  
Next, I divide the individuals in the balanced sample of refugee men into two groups: 
1) individuals assigned to (i.e. initially live in) a socially deprived neighborhood (2,573 
individuals, i.e. 16.7%) and 2) individuals assigned elsewhere (12,863 individuals). One 
can consider assignment to a socially deprived neighborhood by the authorities as a 
treatment and refer to the group of individuals who received treatment as the treatment 
group. Individuals who were assigned to a non-deprived neighborhood constitute the 
control group. Individuals in the treatment group are assigned in the period 1986-1998 to 
one of 166 socially deprived neighborhoods (many of which are adjacent). These socially 
deprived neighborhoods are located in the four Danish cities (Copenhagen, Aarhus, 
Odense and Aalborg) and 34 towns in Denmark20 and include immigrant-dense 
residential areas which are often mentioned in the Danish media because of incidents of 
e.g. vandalism.21 Maps of the socially deprived neighborhoods in the four largest 
20 Helsingoer, Kokkedal, Hilleroed, Kgs. Lyngby, Herlev, Albertslund, Hvidovre, Broendby, Ishoej, Hoeje 
Taastrup, Hedehusene, Roskilde, Holbaek, Kalundborg, Korsoer, Slagelse, Naestved, Nakskov, Svendborg, 
Soenderborg, Haderslev, Esbjerg, Kolding, Fredericia, Vejle, Horsens, Silkeborg, Randers, Viborg, 
Holstebro, Nykoebing Mors, Thisted, Frederikshavn and Hjoerring. 
21 My definition of socially deprived neighborhoods includes Tingbjerg and Lundtoftegade in Copenhagen, 
Taastrupgård, Vejleaaparken and Broendby Strand in the suburbs west of Copenhagen, Vollsmose in 
Odense, Byparken in Svendborg, Varbergparken in Haderslev, Kvaglund and Stengaardsvej in Esbjerg, 
Sundparken and Soenderbro in Horsens, Skovvejen/Skovparken in Kolding, Gellerupparken and 
Bispehaven in Aarhus and Sebbersundvej in Aalborg. 
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municipalities are shown in appendix Figures A1-A4. Each neighborhood consists of a 
number of hectare cells. Hectare cells marked with red are located in socially deprived 
neighborhoods while hectare cells marked with blue are located in non-deprived 
neighborhoods. In the analysis below neighborhoods are used as the spatial unit. 
The implementation of the spatial dispersal policy gives no reason to believe that the 
allocation of refugees across neighborhoods has been in response to individual abilities. 
This is apparent from Table 6, where I report the mean values of personal attributes at the 
time of immigration of the treatment and control groups (columns 1 and 2) and a t-test of 
difference in means (third column). The t-test of difference in means shows that there are 
no significant differences in educational attainment between the two groups. Older, 
married individuals with children aged 3-17 were initially over-represented in socially 
deprived neighborhoods, because large apartments suitable for families are 
overrepresented in socially deprived neighborhoods. Furthermore, column 1 of appendix 
Table A2 shows the coefficient estimates from linear regression of an indicator for 
assignment to a socially deprived neighborhood on personal attributes at the time of 
assignment (age, indicators for educational attainment, being married, having a child 
aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17, year of immigration and country of origin). The R2-
value is very low (0.035) and the only significant coefficient estimates are: the indicator 
for having a child aged 3-17, year of immigration (refugees who immigrated at the end of 
the period were more likely to be assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood) and 
country of origin (relative to Iranian refugees, refugees from Vietnam were slightly more 
likely to be assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood, while refugees from Sri Lanka 
were slightly less likely to be assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood). This 
suggests that conditional on a few observed personal attributes (having a child aged 3-17, 
year of immigration and country of origin), refugees have initially been randomly 
allocated across neighborhood type (socially deprived or not). 
Moreover, I regress other demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
neighborhood of assignment in the year of assignment on individual characteristics in the 
year of assignment: log employment rate of men aged 18-60, log employment rate of 
non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60, log percentage non-Western immigrant men 
aged 18-60, log employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 and log percentage co-
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national men aged 18-60. These coefficient estimates are also reported in appendix Table 
A2 (see columns 2-6). Again, there is no systematic correlation between the observed 
family characteristics and any of these area characteristics. Remember that while age, 
number of children, and marital status was observed by the authorities before allocation, 
education was not.  
A related question is whether some individuals were more likely to realize their 
preferred neighborhood choice than others. I investigate this question by analyzing 
whether the decision to move away from the neighborhood of assignment was affected by 
their educational attainment at the time of assignment, conditional on demographic 
individual characteristics as well as characteristics of the neighborhood of assignment 
and municipality of assignment. The results are reported in Table 7. There are no 
significant differences in the probability of moving neighborhood between educational 
groups. Inclusion of neighborhood of assignment characteristics increases the explanatory 
power from 7.5% (column 1) to 11.0% (column 7). In particular, the probability of 
neighborhood relocation decreases with assignment to a socially deprived neighborhood, 
the log of the employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of assignment and the log of the employment rate of co-national men aged 
18-60 living in the neighborhood of assignment. These results suggest that refugee men 
derive high utility from living in a socially deprived neighborhood (which is partly 
explained by their preference for living close to other non-Western immigrants and 
access to large and high-quality public housing apartments) and close to employed non-
Western immigrant men and co-national men.
These results provide strong support for the refugee dispersal policy being quasi-
random. Therefore, an indicator for assignment to a socially deprived neighborhood 
should be a valid instrument for current residence in a socially deprived neighborhood 
controlling for observed family characteristics, country of origin and year of immigration.   
Another important issue is whether the indicator for assignment to a socially deprived 
neighborhood is a strong predictor for current residence in a socially deprived 
neighborhood up to six years after assignment. This depends on the extent to which 
refugees stayed in the neighborhood of assignment. As shown in appendix Table A3, six 
years after assignment 50% of individuals in the balanced sample of refugee men were 
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still living in the municipality of assignment of which 28.8% were still living in the 
neighborhood of assignment. According to Table 7, assignment to a socially deprived 
neighborhood increased the probability of staying in the neighborhood of assignment by 
15.5 percentage points. Moreover, for neighborhood movers, assignment to a socially 
deprived neighborhood significantly increased the probability of moving to another 
socially deprived neighborhood. Further investigation shows that this effect is entirely 
driven by individuals who moved to another neighborhood within the municipality of 
assignment. For those individuals, assignment to a socially deprived neighborhood 
increased the probability of moving to another socially deprived neighborhood by 9.8 
percentage points, controlling for individual characteristics.22 Therefore, I expect that the 
indicator for assignment to a socially deprived neighborhood is a strong predictor for 
current residence in a socially deprived neighborhood up to six years after assignment. 
IV.C Instrumental variables model 
The instrumental variables model is given by 
(3)       
࢟࢏࢐࢑ሺ࢚ା࢙ሻכ ൌ ࢻࡰ࢏࢐࢑ሺ࢚ା࢙ሻ ൅ ࢄ࢏࢚ࢼ ൅ ࢂ࢐כࢽ ൅ ࢾ࢑ ൅ ࢾ࢚ ൅ ࢾ࢙ ൅ ࢾ࢐כ ൅ ࣆ࢏ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢐࢑ሺ࢚ା࢙ሻ
where the variables and indices are the same as in equation 2 if nothing else is stated 
below. The index s denotes years since assignment (s=2, …, 6), įs are fixed effects for 
years since assignment and ʅi are individual-specific random effects which control for 
unobserved, time-invariant individual characteristics like innate abilities. The IV models 
are estimated using two different specifications. Specification 1 is the same as equation 3, 
except for exclusion of municipality of assignment fixed effects. That is, specification 1 
uses both within and between municipality variation in neighborhood characteristics to 
identify the effect of living in a socially deprived neighborhood. By contrast, 
specification 2 is given in equation 3 and includes municipality of assignment fixed 
effects įj*, i.e. relies only on within municipality variation in neighborhood 
characteristics. This means that specification 2 compares labor market outcomes of 
individuals assigned to different types of neighborhoods within the same municipality. In 
22 These results are available upon request. 
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other words, specification 2 controls for any unobserved time-invariant municipality 
characteristic which affects individual labor market outcomes. Therefore, specification 2 
is a strong strategy for identification of neighborhood effects. 
The main identification challenge is to take into account that Dijk(t+s) is an endogenous 
explanatory variable. Refugees could move away from the neighborhood of assignment 
any time after initial assignment as long as they were able to find alternative housing and 
the relocation decision is likely to be influenced by unobserved, time-varying individual 
characteristics like host-country and English language skills which also influence the 
individual’s employment probability. Therefore, I instrument Dijk(t+s) by an indicator for 
individual i having been assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood in municipality j*
in year t denoted Dij*kt. The identifying assumption is that neighborhood assignment is 
random, conditional on family composition, source country and year of immigration. 
Under the assumption of homogenous treatment effects, the IV estimate of Į is the 
average treatment effect of living in a socially deprived neighborhood for individuals in 
the balanced sample of refugee men.  
Summary statistics of the dependent variable for the overall balanced sample of 
refugee men and by treatment status are shown in appendix Table A4. Six years after 
immigration 30.6% of refugee men have a job and the average real annual earnings of 
refugee men with wage income was DKK 62,318 (in 2000-prices).23
Panel A of Table 8 shows the coefficient estimates of living in a socially deprived 
neighborhood 2-6 years after immigration. Inclusion of individual-specific random 
effects in equation 3 decreases the magnitude of the estimates relative to the estimates of 
equation 2 reported in Table 4, but the coefficient estimates remains significant and 
negative. These estimates are those one would obtain using the observational data 
approach.  
Panel B of Table 8 shows the estimated effects of assignment to a socially deprived 
neighborhood on the employment probability 2-6 years after immigration (in columns 1-
2) and on log real annual earnings 2-6 years after immigration (in columns 5-6) for the 
two different specifications. These estimates show the effects of the policy of random 
23 For comparison, in 2000, 84% of men aged 20-59 in Denmark was employed 
(www.Statistikbanken.dk/RASA and BEF5) and their mean real annual earnings were DKK 238,294 
(www.Statistikbanken.dk/ INDKP1). 
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assignment across socially deprived and non-deprived neighborhoods. Therefore, they 
can be interpreted as intent-to-treat estimates. There are no significant differences in the 
employment probability and real annual earnings of individuals in the treatment and 
control group 2-6 years after immigration. In other words, assignment to a socially 
deprived neighborhood did neither affect the employment probability nor real annual 
earnings of refugees 2-6 years after assignment. 
Next, I estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of living in a socially deprived 
neighborhood on individual labor market outcomes using two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
I instrument the indicator for living in a socially deprived neighborhood 2-6 years after 
immigration by an indicator for assignment to a socially deprived neighborhood. The first 
stage regression estimates of the instrument on the endogenous explanatory variable are 
reported in Panel C in Table 8. For the overall sample, ceteris paribus, assignment to a 
socially deprived neighborhood significantly increases the probability of living in a 
socially deprived neighborhood 2-6 years after immigration by 24.2% (t-statistic of 10), 
i.e. the instrument is a strong predictor of the endogenous explanatory variable. The 2SLS 
estimates of living in a socially deprived neighborhood 2-6 years after immigration on 
individual labor market outcomes are also reported in Panel C of Table 8; the 2SLS 
estimates are positive, but insignificant.  
I interpret the insignificant 2SLS estimates of living in a socially deprived 
neighborhood as evidence that the negative and significant statistical associations 
between living in a socially deprived neighborhood and individual labor market outcomes 
(reported in Panel A of Table 8 and in Table 4) are entirely due to negative self-selection 
of individuals (e.g. individuals with poor host-country and English language skills) into 
socially deprived neighborhoods. Controlling for individual self-selection into 
neighborhoods, living in a socially deprived neighborhood does not affect individual 
labor market outcomes. 
An obvious criticism of my analysis is that the 60% employment rate threshold used to 
categorize neighborhoods as socially deprived and non-deprived is somewhat arbitrary. 
Therefore, I estimate an alternative model, in which the bivariate explanatory variable 
“living in a socially deprived neighborhood”, Dijk(t+s), in equation 3 is replaced by the 
continuous variable “the log of the employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in the 
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neighborhood of residence”. I estimate the ATE of the log of the employment rate of men 
aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence” by 2SLS using the log employment 
rate of men aged 18-60 living the neighborhood of assignment as instrument. As shown 
in Panel C of Table 9, the instrument is a strong predictor: Using the specification with 
municipality of assignment fixed effects, a log increase in the employment rate of men 
aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of assignment increases the log of the employment 
rate of men aged 18-60 in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after assignment by 
0.309 (t-statistic of 8.2) in the employment model 2 and by 0.236 (t-statistic of 8.6) in the 
earnings model. However, as shown in Panel B of Table 9, the intent-to-treat estimates 
are close to zero and insignificant. Recall that the 2SLS estimate is defined as the intent-
to-treat estimate (reported in Panel B) divided by the first-stage regression estimate 
(reported in Panel C). Therefore, the insignificant intent-to-treat estimates translates into 
insignificant 2SLS estimates of the log employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of residence on the employment probability (columns 1-2) and log of real 
annual earnings (columns 5-6) reported in Panel C of Table 9. In other words, the 
employment rate of men living in neighborhood of residence does neither affect the 
employment probability of refugee men, nor their real annual earnings 2-6 years after 
immigration. The results from separate estimation of low-skilled and highly skilled men 
are reported in columns 3-4 and 7-8 of Table 9. As for the full sample, the 2SLS 
estimates are insignificant for both skill groups.  
Since the 2SLS estimates reported in Panel C of Table 9 are insignificant, the positive 
and significant correlations between the log employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in 
the neighborhood of residence and individual labor market outcomes 2-6 years after 
immigration (reported in the Panel A of Table 9) must be due to positive self-selection of 
individuals into neighborhoods with a relatively high employment rate of men aged 18-
60.  
In the next subsection, I estimate alternative models of neighborhood effects.  
IV.D Ethnic stratification of networks   
Recall from Section II.A that 26.3% of immigrants in the Welfare Research Survey had 
found their latest (wage earner) job through their social network. Panel C of Table 2 
shows that 74.7% (87.2% of low-skilled) of immigrant survey respondents who found 
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their latest job through their social network found it through other immigrants. This 
descriptive evidence suggests that immigrants interact primarily with neighbors of 
immigrant origin. If so, the employment rate of non-Western immigrant men is a better 
measure of the employment rate of contacts of refugee men.  
Therefore, I estimate the model in equation 3, except that Dijk(t+s) is replaced by the log 
employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood 
of residence 2-6 years after immigration. I instrument the log employment rate of non-
Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years 
after immigration by the log employment rate of non-Western immigration men aged 18-
60 living in the neighborhood of assignment and an indicator for no other non-Western 
immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of assignment in the year of 
assignment. The 2SLS results are reported in Panel B of Table 10. Both instruments are 
strong predictors of the log employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of residence. Using specification 2, a log increase in the employment rate 
of non-Western immigrants living in the neighborhood of assignment increases the log 
employment rate of non-Western immigrants living in the current neighborhood of 
residence by 0.031 (t-statistic of 6.0) in the employment model and by 0.028 (t-statistic of 
5.1) in the earnings model. According to the 2SLS estimates, the log employment rate of 
non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence has a 
positive and significant effect on the individual’s employment probability as well as on 
real annual earnings. Separate results for low- and highly skilled men are reported in 
columns 3-4 (employment model) and columns 8-9 (earnings model) of Table 10. The 
2SLS estimates are positive for both skill groups and significant for highly skilled. 
Around the mean of 36.8%, a percentage point increase in the employment rate of non-
Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence corresponds 
to 0.03 of a log increase. This implies that, on average, a percentage point increase in the 
employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood 
of residence (around the mean) increases the individual’s employment probability by 
(0.03*0.065=) 0.2 percentage points and log real annual earnings by (0.03*0.808=) 0.02, 
corresponding to a 2% increase in real annual earnings 2-6 years after immigration. 
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As seen from the 2SLS estimates reported in columns 6 and 12 of Panel B in Table 10, 
these results are robust to inclusion of the log of the percentage non-Western immigrant 
men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration 
(instrumented by the log of the percentage non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 
living in the neighborhood of assignment). Moreover, according to the 2SLS estimate 
reported in column 6, the log percentage non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living 
in the neighborhood of residence decreases the individual’s employment probability 2-6 
years after immigration. However, the effect turns insignificant after inclusion of the 
interaction between the log employment rate of non-Western immigrant men and the log 
percentage non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of 
residence 2-6 years after immigration (see column 7 in Table 10).24     
The results in Table 10 provide strong evidence of neighborhood effects, in particular 
that non-Western immigrant men in part find jobs through employed contacts of non-
Western immigrant origin living in the neighborhood of residence. But are all employed 
contacts of non-Western immigrant origin in the neighborhood equally useful for finding 
a (well-paid) job? Or are employed contacts from the individual’s own source country 
(henceforth referred to as co-nationals) particularly valuable? I investigate this question 
by estimating the 2SLS estimate of the log of the employment rate of co-national men 
aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence using the same model as equation 3, 
except that Dijk(t+s) is replaced by the log employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 
living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration. As instruments I use 
the log of the employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 in the neighborhood of 
assignment and an indicator for no other co-national men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood assignment in the year of assignment as instruments. The 2SLS results for 
the overall sample using two different specifications (without and with municipality of 
assignment fixed effects) are reported in Panel B of Table 11, columns 1-2 (employment 
model) and 8-9 (earnings model). Both instruments have strong predictive power in the 
first stage of the employment model, whereas in the earnings model only the second 
24 As instrument for the interaction variable, I use the interaction between the log employment rate of non-
Western immigrant men and the log percentage non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of assignment. The instrument is a strong predictor in both models (employment and 
earnings models). 
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instrument has strong predictive power. According to the 2SLS estimates, the log 
employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 
has a positive, but insignificant effect on the individual’s employment probability, and a 
positive and significant effect on individual real annual earnings. One percentage point 
increase in the employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration (around the sample mean of 
23.2%) corresponds to a log increase of 0.04 and therefore increases log real annual 
earnings by (0.04*0.407=) 0.02, or real annual earnings by 2%. The effect is of the same 
magnitude for low- and highly skilled (see columns 10-11 in Table 11). 
I also investigate whether the size of the co-ethnic network in the neighborhood affects 
individual labor market outcomes. I do so by estimating the effect of the log of the 
percentage co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence using 
2SLS. The set of controls is the same as in equation 3. As instruments I use the log of the 
percentage co-national men aged 18-60 and an indicator for no other co-national men 
living in the neighborhood of assignment. The results are presented in columns 5 and 10 
of Table 11. The first instrument is a strong predictor; the t-statistic is 3.5 in the 
employment model and 3.2 in the earnings model. According to the 2SLS estimates in 
Panel B of Table 11, columns 5 and 10, the log percentage co-national men aged 18-60 
living in the neighborhood of residence has a positive, but insignificant effect on the 
individual’s employment probability, and a positive and significant effect (at a 10% 
significance level) on log real annual earnings. The latter result is very interesting. It 
suggests that the finding of Edin et al. (2003) and Damm (2009) of a positive effect of 
ethnic enclave size on individual real annual earnings can be interpreted as a 
neighborhood effect. 
However, the size and the quality of the local ethnic enclave are positively correlated 
because larger ethnic enclaves are more established. Therefore, the positive and 
significant effect of log percentage co-nationals aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of 
residence on the individual’s real annual earnings 2-6 years after immigration may ve 
upward biased due to omission of ethnic enclave quality. To test this hypothesis, I add the 
log employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of 
residence 2-6 years after immigration as an additional explanatory variable to the model 
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with the log of percent co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of 
residence 2-6 years after immigration. As instruments I use the log employment rate of 
co-national men aged 18-60 living, the log percentage co-national men aged 18-60 and an 
indicator for no other co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of 
assignment in the year of assignment. The results are presented in columns 6 and 13 of 
Table 11.25 According to the 2SLS estimates reported in Panel B, the 2SLS estimate of 
the log percentage co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-
6 years after immigration approaches zero in the employment model and turns negative, 
but insignificant in the earnings model in response to inclusion of the log employment 
rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence. By contrast, 
the 2SLS estimate of the log employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of residence on real annual earnings 2-6 years after immigration remains 
positive and significant and increases slightly in magnitude relative to the model without 
the log percentage co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 
reported in columns 8 and 9 of Table 11. These findings provide quasi-experimental 
evidence that it is the quality - not the size - of the co-ethnic network living in the 
neighborhood that matters for the individual’s real annual earnings. 
Finally, I test whether it is the quality of non-Western immigrant contacts or the 
quality of the co-ethnic network that matters for the individual’s labor market outcomes. I 
do so by estimating the effect of the log employment rate of non-Western immigrant men 
aged 18-60 and the log employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 who live in the 
municipality of residence on individual labor market outcomes 2-6 years after 
immigration by 2SLS.26 The 2SLS estimates are reported in Panel B of Table 11 
(columns 7 and 14). Recall from Table 10, column 2, that the employment effect of the 
log employment rate of non-Western immigrants living in the neighborhood of residence 
is positive and significant. The 2SLS estimates reported in Table 11, column 7, show that 
the positive employment effect of the log employment rate of non-Western immigrant 
25 With t-statistics between 3 and 4, all instrumental variables are strong predictors in the employment 
model, and the two last-mentioned instrumental variables are strong predictors in the earnings model. 
26 As instrument I use the log employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 and the log 
employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 who live in the municipality of assignment in the year of 
assignment as well as two indicators for no other non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 and no other co-
national men aged 18-60 living in the municipality of assignment in the year of assignment. The instrument 
has strong predictive power. 
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men living in the neighborhood of residence decreases in response to inclusion of the log 
employment rate of co-national men living in the neighborhood of residence as an 
additional explanatory variable. Similarly, the positive 2SLS estimate of the log 
employment rate of co-national men living in the neighborhood of residence on the 
individual’s employment probability (reported in column 2, Table 11) decreases in 
response to inclusion of the log employment rate of non-Western immigrant men living 
in the neighborhood of residence as an additional explanatory variable. These findings 
suggest that the individual’s employment probability is positively affected by a high 
employment rate of both non-Western immigrant men and co-national men aged 18-60 
living in the neighborhood of residence. The 2SLS estimates reported in Table 11, 
column 14, show that the finding of a positive and significant earnings effect of log of the 
employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living the neighborhood of residence 
reported in Table 11, columns 8 and 9, is robust to inclusion of the log employment rate 
of non-Western immigrant men living in the neighborhood of residence as an additional 
explanatory variable; the magnitude of the 2SLS estimate is virtually unchanged. By 
contrast, the estimate of the earnings effect of log employment rate of non-Western 
immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood reported in Table 10 approaches 
zero and becomes insignificant in response to inclusion of the log employment rate of co-
national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood. I interpret the 2SLS estimates 
reported in Table 11, column 14, as evidence that immigrant real annual earnings are 
positively affected by the employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of residence and not affected by the employment rate of non-Western 
immigrant men from other source countries living in the neighborhood of residence. 
My findings of i) a positive employment effect of a log increase in the employment 
rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood (reported in 
Table 10) and ii) a positive earnings effect of a log increase in the employment rate of co-
national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence (reported in Table 11) 
are robust to exclusion of refugees who were assigned to Copenhagen City. This is seen 
by comparison with the 2SLS estimates for this subsample reported in Table 12.  
Moreover, further investigation shows that the positive and significant 2SLS estimates 
of the log employment rate of the non-Western immigrant network and of the co-ethnic 
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network in the neighborhood reported in Tables 9 and 10, respectively, are homogenous 
both across years since assignment and country of origin.27
Summing up, the 2SLS estimates of various neighborhood characteristics presented in 
this section of the paper is strong evidence that labor market outcomes of refugee men of 
non-Western origin 2-6 years after immigration i) are not influenced by residence in a 
socially deprived neighborhood, ii) are not influenced by the log of the employment rate 
of men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence, iii) are positively affected by 
the log of the employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of residence (also after inclusion of the log percentage non-Western 
immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence). I interpret these 
results as evidence that residence-based networks are ethnically stratified as suggested by 
e.g. Hellerstein, McInerney and Neumark (2011).  
Furthermore, individual log real annual earnings are positively affected by i) the log of 
the employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of 
residence (also after inclusion of the log percentage co-national men aged 18-60 in 
percent of men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence), and ii) the log 
percentage co-national men aged 18-60 in percent of men aged 18-60 living in the 
neighborhood of residence, but the latter 2SLS estimate turns insignificant if the log 
employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 
is included in the model. Overall, I interpret my quasi-experimental findings as evidence 
that non-Western immigrants find jobs in part through their employed contacts of non-
Western immigrant and co-ethnic origin living in their neighborhood and that the 
individual’s employment probability and annual earnings increase with the quality of 
contacts. 
V. Conclusion 
It is a stylized fact that a substantial share of workers finds jobs through personal 
contacts. However, little is known about which types of contacts are useful in job search. 
My results shed substantial light on this issue. I use two different strategies to identify the 
effects of the quality and quantity of strong and weak ties taking into account individual 
27 The results are available from the author upon request. 
33
self-selection into social networks, i.e. that people are more likely to become friends or 
acquainted with people with similar demographic characteristics and socio-economic 
background. Using self-reported information about characteristics of personal contacts, I 
find for unemployed survey respondents that having acquaintances of which the majority 
are employed significantly increases the individual’s job-finding rate, whereas the effect 
of the number of acquaintances is insignificant.  
My quasi-experimental neighborhood effects for refugee men of non-Western origin 
provide further evidence of the positive influence of employed acquaintances. A 
percentage point increase (around the mean) in the employment rate of non-Western 
immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence increases the 
employment probability of refugee men of non-Western origin by 0.2 percentage points, 
or 0.7%. Similarly, a percentage point increase (around the mean) in the employment rate 
of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence increases real 
annual earnings of refugee men by 2%. The results are robust to inclusion of the 
percentage non-Western immigrant men and percentage co-national men living in the 
neighborhood of residence. A potential explanation for these asymmetric findings is that 
while employed contacts of non-Western immigrant origin are useful for finding a job in 
the host-country, employed co-national contacts are useful for finding a job which 
matches the individual’s skills, because only co-nationals know the value of the 
individual’s education obtained in the country of origin. That is, co-national contacts 
disseminate information which increases the job-worker match quality and thereby the 
hourly wage rate (for theoretical and empirical evidence on this mechanism, see Damm, 
2009, and Dustmann, Glitz and Schönberg, 2011). 
Overall, my findings provide strong evidence that the quality of acquaintances 
(including neighbors of similar gender and ethnic origin) influences individual labor 
market outcomes: the higher the employment rate of acquaintances, the easier it is to find 
a job and the better paid it is. These findings suggest that unemployed individuals with 
more employed contacts receive more informal information about job vacancies. By 
contrast, overall my findings lend little support to the view that the number of 
acquaintances should have an effect.  
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The results have important policy implications for labor market integration of 
immigrants. Policy makers in countries in which the authorities disperse newly 
recognized refugees across regions can use this result for optimal design. Previous 
research on spatial dispersal of refugees emphasizes the importance of refugee settlement 
in regions with a low unemployment rate (Åslund and Rooth, 2007). In view of the 
results of this paper, policy makers should also help refugees find housing in 
neighborhoods with established immigrant networks because these promote labor market 
outcomes of new immigrants. More generally, the results suggest that successful local 
employment policies targeted at a subgroup of immigrants entail positive externalities for 
their immigrant acquaintances.      
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Danes Immigrants Danes Immigrants
1 2 3 4
Woman 0.529 0.448 0.739 0.62
(0.500) (0.498)  (0.442) (0.490)
Age 32.6 34.0 32.2 34.6 
(7.7) (7.5) (7.3) (6.9)
Married 0.42 0.685 0.435 0.738
 (0.494) (0.465)  (0.499) (0.441)
Child aged 0-2 0.181 0.199 0.319 0.278
(0.385) (0.399) (0.469) (0.449)
Child aged 3-17 0.487 0.611 0.493 0.711
(0.5) (0.488)  (0.504)  (0.454)
Educational attainment:
0-9 years of education 0.009 0.231 0 0.399
(0.095) (0.422)  (0.491)
10-12 years of education 0.651 0.493 0.841 0.407
 (0.477) (0.500)  (0.369)  (0.492)
More than 12 years of education 0.34 0.275 0.159 0.194
 (0.474) (0.447) (0.369) (0.396)
Unknown educational attainment 0 0.001 0 0
(0.036)
Immigration year - 1989.4 - 1990.9 
(8.1) (8.2)
Country of origin:
Denmark 1 0 1 0
Iran 0 0.389 0 0.316
(0.488) (0.466)
Turkey 0 0.35 0 0.426
(0.477) (0.495)
Pakistan 0 0.262 0 0.259
(0.440)  (0.439)
Labor market outcomes:
Employed in Nov. 2006/2007 0.923 0.764 0.652 491
(0.266) (0.425) (0.480)  (0.501)
6.83 3.13 4.38 2.14
(8.45) (4.25) (6.21) (3.30)
Municipality of residence characteristics:
Log(inhabitants) 10.65 11.41 10.40 11.52
(1.38) (1.24) (1.42) (1.30)
Log(mean gross income) 12.31 12.30 12.29 12.28
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08)  (0.08)
Unemployment rate 4.60 4.90 4.99 5.10 
(1.45) (1.16)  (1.81) (1.11)
N 874 1575 69 263
Table 1.A: Summary statistics of sample of survey respondents.
All Unemployed
Work experience since 1980 (full-
time years)
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Danes Immigrants Danes Immigrants
1 2 3 4
0.763 0.596 0 0
(0.425) (0.491)
Proficient in Danish - 0.634 - 0.456
(0.482)  (0.500)
Proficient in English 0.882 0.56 0.826 0.35
(0.323) (0.497) (0.382) (0.478)
Reason for immigration:
Family-reunification with spouse - 0.345 - 0.217
(0.476)  (0.413)
Family-reunification with parents - 0.283 - 0.483
(0.451)  (0.501)
Refugee - 0.291 - 0.232
(0.454)  (0.423)
- 0.04 - 0.03
(0.196) (0.172)
Other - 0.034 - 0.03
(0.182)  (0.172)
Network size:
Number of acquaintances in DK 34.82 29.28 26.45 25.43 
 (26.35)  (25.68) (23.04) (24.99)
0.443 0.387 0.319 0.33
(0.497)  (0.487) (0.469)  (0.47)
- 0.268 - 0.384
(0.443) (0.487)
High employment rate of:
Family members in DK 0.954 0.58 0.928 0.517
(0.209)  (0.494)  (0.261) (0.501)
Close friends in DK 0.935 0.795 0.884 0.726
 (0.247) (0.404)  (0.323) (0.447)
Acquaintances in DK 0.891 0.78 0.812 0.722
(0.311)  (0.414) (0.394) (0.449)
High level of education of:
Family members in DK 0.891 0.391 0.841 0.274
(0.311) (0.488) (0.369) (0.447)
Close friends in DK 0.852 0.563 0.797 0.453
(0.355) (0.496) (0.405) (0.498)
Acquaintances in DK 0.736 0.48 0.696 0.361
(0.441) (0.500)  (0.464) (0.481)
N 874 1575 69 263
All
Employed in the week before the 
interview
Unemployed
Table 1.B: Summary statistics of sample of survey respondents.
Work or education in Denmark 
(DK)
Majority of immigrant 
acquaintances in Denmark
Number of acquaintances in DK 
above average
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Danes Immigrants Danes Immigrants
1 2 3 4
0.421 0.677 0.478 0.73
(0.494) (0.468)  (0.503)  (0.445)
Unemployedindividualsshouldbewillingtomovetogetapermanentjob:
View of respondent: 0.338 0.489 0.188 0.418
 (0.494) (0.500)  (0.394) (0.494)
View of family in DK 0.336 0.225 0.188 0.186
(0.473) (0.418) (0.394) (0.39)
View of close friends in DK 0.305 0.298 0.159 0.243
(0.461)  (0.457)  (0.369) (0.430)
Unemployed individuals ought to be willing to work at a salary below the incomes as unemployed:
View of respondent 0.315 0.354 0.232 0.285
(0.465)  (0.478) (0.425) (0.452)
View of family in DK 0.292 0.17 0.174 0.107
 (0.455) (0.376) (0.382) (0.309)
View of close friends in DK 0.227 0.198 0.145 0.148
(0.419) (0.399) (0.355) (0.356)
It is humiliating to receive social assistance:
View of respondent 0.243 0.482 0.304 0.449
(0.429)  (0.500) (0.464) (0.498)
View of family in DK 0.263 0.282 0.275 0.213
(0.441) (0.450) (0.500) (0.410)
View of close friends in DK 0.22 0.333 0.232 0.319
(0.414) (0.472) (0.425) (0.467)
N 874 1575 69 263
Note: Missing values of educational attainment information in the administrative registers have been replaced by
educational attainment information from the Welfare Research Survey conducted by SFI Survey in 2006 in
Denmark.
Source: Panel A: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark, Panel B: Welfare Research Survey
conducted by SFI Survey in Denmark in 2006.
Work attitude: Work primarily to 
earn a living




All All Low-skilled Highly skilled
1 2 3 4
Direct search channel 70.5 66.7 60.3 68.7
Network 16.6 26.3 36.0 23.3
Other 12.9 7 3.8 8.0
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0
N 668 987 239 747
Employment agency 13.8 28.7 44.4 24.4
Direct application to employer 44.2 44.2 38.2 45.8
Temp agency 1.5 2 1.4 2.1
Spare time job 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.8
Reply to job advertisement in the media 40.3 24.2 15.3 26.7
Unknown 0 0.1 0 0.2
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 471 658 144 513
Danish relatives 19.1 1.5 0 2.3
Danish close friends 47.3 14.6 5.8 18.9
Danish acquaintances 33.6 8.1 5.8 9.2
Relatives of immigrant origin 35.8 41.9 32.8
Close friends of immigrant origin 31.2 36.0 28.7
Acquaintances of immigrant origin 7.7 9.3 6.9
Unknown 1.1 1.2 1.2
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 110 260 86 174
Note : Only four Danish respondents are low-skilled.
Source:  Welfare Research Survey conducted by SFI Survey in Denmark in 2006.
Panel A: Means of finding the latest job (%)
Panel B: Direct search channel used to find the latest job (%)
Panel C: Network channel used to find the latest job (%)
Table 2: Summary statistics of means of finding the latest job. Survey respondents who were in the 
labor force one week before the interview and who work/have worked as an employee.
Immigrants
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- - - - 0.165* 0.191** 0.196** 0.181** 0.189**
 (0.071) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.060)
0.01 -0.048 -0.054 -0.197 0.288** 0.285** 0.282** 0.274** 0.244**
(0.156) (0.172) (0.183) (0.210)  (0.089) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.087)
Social network characteristics:
- 0.026 -0.005 0.055 - 0.005 -0.079 0.045 0.049
(0.108) (0.134) (0.116)  (0.041) (0.079) (0.053)  (0.055)
- - 0.035 - - - 0.105 - -
 (0.173) (0.083)
- - - - - - - -0.085 -0.08
 (0.051) (0.058)
- - - - - - - -0.115† -0.138**
 (0.068) (0.068)
High employment rate of: 
Family in DK - -0.276 -0.269 -0.515 - -0.118 -0.116 -0.116 -0.144†
(0.343) (0.350) (0.296) (0.071)  (0.071) (0.072) (0.081)
Close friends in DK - 0.006 0.006 0.199 - -0.041 -0.043 -0.042 -0.025
(0.199) (0.202) (0.239) (0.065)  (0.066) (0.067) (0.065)
Acquaintances in DK - 0.410* 0.409* 0.488* - 0.135† 0.176* 0.130* 0.119†
 (0.185)  (0.186) (0.219) (0.069)  (0.072)  (0.065)  (0.064)
High skill level of:
Family in DK - 0.277 0.276 0.341 - 0.039 0.033 0.032 0.016
 (0.167) (0.170)  (0.219) (0.077) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080)
Close friends in DK - -0.266 -0.263 -0.381 - 0.004 0.013 -0.007 -0.021
(0.194) (0.200) (0.192)  (0.077) (0.080) (0.077)  (0.071)
Acquaintances in DK - -0.031 -0.027 0.011 - -0.024 -0.025 -0.019 -0.008
(0.150) (0.156) (0.168)  (0.076) (0.075) (0.077)  (0.075)
- - - 0.029 - - - - -0.135
(0.159) (0.089)
“Unemployed individuals should be willing to move to get a permanent job”: 
View of respondent - - - -0.498** - - - - -0.023
(0.176) (0.077)
View of family in DK - - - 0.295 - - - - 0.005
 (0.238) (0.081)
“Unemployed individuals ought to be willing to work at a salary below the income as unemployed”:
View of respondent - - - 0.252 - - - - 0.022
(0.195) (0.094)
View of family in DK - - - -0.234 - - - - -0.053
(0.265) (0.117)
“It is humiliating to receive social assistance”:
View of respondent - - - -0.002 - - - - -0.124
(0.223) (0.088)
View of family in DK - - - -0.274 - - - - 0.151
 (0.262) (0.100)
R2 0.213 0.300 0.300 0.400 0.290 0.324 0.327 0.336 0.358
N
Table 3: Coefficient estimates from linear regression of being employed in Nov. 2006 or Nov. 2007 on 




work to earn a living
Majority of immigrant 
acquaintances
No. acquaintances*high 
employment rate of acq.
Number of acquaintances






Source: Welfare Research Survey conducted by SFI Survey in Denmark in 2006 linked with administrative registers from
Statistics Denmark.
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05, †: P<0.1. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by municipality of
residence. Additional controls: indicators for gender, marital status, having a child aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17,
educational attainment (0-9 years or missing, 10-12 years or more than 12 years), work experience, work experience
squared, interactions between female and married, female and a child aged 0-2 and female and a child aged 3-17, and
socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality of residence (log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross
income)). Additional controls for immigrants: Indicators for year of immigration, country of origin and self-reported reason
for immigration (family re-unification with spouse, family re-unification with parents, refugee, work or education in Denmark
or other reason). Share of individuals who are employed in Nov. 2006 or 2007: Danes: 0.65 (0.48), immigrants: 0.49
(0.50).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Neighborhood of residence:
Socially deprived -0.045** -0.045** -0.022* -0.023† -0.063** -0.063** -0.101* -0.095** -0.054 -0.015 -0.142* -0.140*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.044) (0.046) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
Controls for area of assignment:
Municipality of assignment FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.099 0.1157 0.1216 0.1533 0.0799 0.1049 0.054 0.0964 0.06 0.1479 0.0551 0.1235
N
Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Source : Administrative registers from Statistics Denmark.
Highly skilled All
Table 4: Coefficient estimates (standard errors) from linear regression of individual labor market outcomes on an indicator for living in a socially deprived 
neighborhood six years after immigration. Balanced panel of male refugees.
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05, †: P<0.1. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by municipality of assignment in specification 1 and neighborhood of assignment in
specification 2. Additional controls: age and age squared, indicators for marital status, having a child aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17, educational attainment, year of immigration
and country of origin and socioeconomic municipality characteristics (log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross income), log(pct. non-Western immigrants) and log(pct.
co-nationals)). Values of control variables are measured in the year of assignment. Share of individuals living in a socially deprived neighborhood (defined as a neighborhood in which
at most 60% of individuals aged 18-60 are employed): 0.352.
Low-skilled Highly skilled
Dependent variable:
Employed in Nov. Ln(real annual earnings)




Socially deprived 3.9 22.8 16.7
Not socially deprived 96.1 77.2 83.3
Source:  Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark.




Initial residence of refugee men in the 
balanced sample
Table 5: Geographical distribution across types of neighborhoods of the overall population in 
Denmark and subgroups of the population. 






0-9 years 0.126 0.119 1.05
(0.33) (0.32)
10-12 years 0.375 0.392 1.59
(0.48) (0.49)
At least 13 years 0.169 0.165 0.42
(0.37) (0.37)
Unknown education 0.330 0.324 0.57
(0.47)  (0.47)
Age 32.1 30.4 6.54
(12.9) (10.7)
Marital status 0.523 0.467 5.15
 (0.50) (0.50)
Child aged 0-2 0.123 0.111 1.66
(0.33) (0.31)
Child aged 3-17 0.231 0.179 5.84
 (0.42) (0.38)
N 2,573 12,863
Source:  Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark.
Neighborhood of assignment: t-test of difference 
in means
Table 6: Location assignment of male, non-Western refugees: Mean 
(standard deviation) of personal attributes in the year of assignment. 
Balanced panel of refugee men.
46
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Educational attainment:
0-9 years of education Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
10-12 years of education Ͳ0.003 Ͳ0.003 Ͳ0.004 Ͳ0.004 Ͳ0.002 Ͳ0.003 Ͳ0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
0.000 Ͳ0.002 Ͳ0.003 Ͳ0.003 0.001 Ͳ0.001 Ͳ0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Unknown education Ͳ0.007 Ͳ0.004 Ͳ0.005 Ͳ0.005 Ͳ0.006 Ͳ0.006 Ͳ0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age Ͳ0.004** Ͳ0.004** Ͳ0.004** Ͳ0.004** Ͳ0.004** Ͳ0.004** Ͳ0.004**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married Ͳ0.008 Ͳ0.008 Ͳ0.008 Ͳ0.008 Ͳ0.008 Ͳ0.009 Ͳ0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Having a child aged 0-2 Ͳ0.060** Ͳ0.058** Ͳ0.059** Ͳ0.059** Ͳ0.061** Ͳ0.059** Ͳ0.059**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Having a child aged 3-17 Ͳ0.082** Ͳ0.075** Ͳ0.075** Ͳ0.075** Ͳ0.084** Ͳ0.083** Ͳ0.077**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Ͳ0.155** Ͳ0.123** Ͳ0.123** Ͳ0.115**













RͲsquared 0.075 0.098 0.100 0.100 0.081 0.078 0.110
N
Source : Administrative registers from Statistics Denmark.
Table 7. OLS estimates. Dependent variable: Indicator for having moved out of the neighbourhood of 
assignment in year t+6. Balanced panel of male refugees.
ln(pct. non-Western immigrant 
men aged 18-60)
Note: †: P<0.1, *: P<0.05, **: P<0.01. Standard errors (clustered by municipality of assignment) reported in
parentheses. Additional controls: Indicators for year of immigration and country of origin and socioeconomic
municipality characteristics (log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross income), log(pct. non-Western
immigrants) and log(pct. co-nationals)). Values of control variables are measured in the year of assignment.
More than 12 years of 
education
ln(mployment rate of co-
national men aged 18-60)
No other non-Western 
immigrant men aged 18-60
No co-national men aged 18-
60




ln(employment rate of non-
Western immigrant men aged 
18-60)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-0.028** -0.027** -0.017** -0.016** -0.037** -0.034** -0.070* -0.062* -0.024 -0.011 -0.115** -0.102**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.028) -0.036 (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
0.004 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.065 0.075 0.04 0.022 0.081 0.108*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.043) (0.040) (0.060) (0.063) (0.042) (0.046)
0.014 0.038 0.019 0.022 0.008 0.043 0.241 0.316 0.129 0.036 0.306 0.456
(0.020) (0.028) (0.027) (0.038) (0.030) (0.040) (0.147) (0.215) (0.208) (0.350) (0.203) (0.271)
First stage of 2SLS (OLS): 
0.297** 0.242** 0.311** 0.247** 0.286** 0.237** 0.274** 0.210** 0.274** 0.185** 0.277** 0.231**
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029)
Controls for area of assignment:
Socio-economic and demographic 
municipality characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality of assignment FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations
Number of individuals
Source : Administrative registers from Statistics Denmark.
Assigned to a socially deprived 
neigborhood
Current residence in a socially deprived 
neigborhood
Current residence in a socially deprived 
neighborhood
Panel B: Intent-to-treat estimates (OLS)
Low-skilled Highly skilled All Low-skilled Highly skilledAll
Table 8: OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of living in a socially deprived neighborhood on individual labor market outcomes. Balanced panel 
of male refugees: YSM=2-6.
Employed in Nov. Log(real annual earnings)
Dependent variable:
Panel A: OLS estimates
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls: individual random effect, age and age squared, indicators for marital status,
having a child aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17, educational attainment, YSM, year of immigration and country of origin and socioeconomic municipality characteristics
(log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross income), log(pct. non-Western immigrants) and log(pct. co-nationals)). Values of control variables are measured in
the year of assignment. Share of individuals assigned to a socially deprived neighborhood (defined as a neighborhood in which at most 60% of individuals aged 18-60 are
employed): 0 167















Low-skilled Highly skilled Low-skilled Highly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.090** 0.087** 0.059** 0.108** 0.314** 0.310** 0.225** 0.090*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.082) (0.075) (0.072) (0.024)
-0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 -0.135 -0.092 -0.108 -0.074
(0.016) (0.012) (0.026) (0.013) (0.109) (0.102) (0.140) (0.103)
-0.007 -0.007 -0.024 0.020 -0.469 -0.358 -0.334 -0.315
(0.036) (0.047) (0.064) (0.068) (0.302) (0.420) (0.651) (0.545)
First stage of 2SLS:
0.370** 0.309** 0.323** 0.298** 0.301** 0.236** 0.221** 0.247**
(0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) (0.040) (0.023)
Controls for area of assignment:
Socio-economic and demographic municipality characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality of assignment FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 34,360 42,820 10,595 14,130
Number of individuals 6,872 8,564 3,849 5,015
Source : Administrative registers from Statistics Denmark.
Ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in current 
neighborhood of residence)
Ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in 
neighborhood of assignment)
Ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in current 
neighborhood of residence)
Employed in Nov. Ln(real annual earnings)
Table 9: OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in the neighbourhood of residence) on individual 
labour market outcomes. Balanced panel of male refugees: YSM=2-6.
Panel A: OLS estimates
All All
Dependent variable:
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls: individual random effect, age and age squared, indicators for marital status,
having a child aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17, educational attainment, YSM, year of immigration and country of origin and socioeconomic municipality characteristics
(log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross income), log(pct. non-Western immigrants) and log(pct. co-nationals)). Values of control variables are measured in
the year of assignment. Ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in the neighbourhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration) has a mean (std. dev.) of 4.22 (0.234).
Ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in 
neighbourhood of assignment)
77,180
Panel B: Intent-to-treat estimates (OLS)





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 0.054** 0.053** 0.058** 0.048** 0.054** 0.059**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
-0.014**-0.014**-0.033** -0.039** -0.042** -0.126**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.035)
0.006** 0.025*
(0.001) (0.010)
0.014 0.065† 0.048 0.086† 0.071† 0.075* 0.486* 0.808** 0.768 0.892* 0.815** 0.812**
(0.029) (0.039) (0.060) (0.048) (0.039) (0.035) (0.243) (0.295) (0.488) (0.374) (0.296) (0.249)
-0.023† -0.025* -0.129 -0.081 -0.135 -0.708
(0.012) (0.013) (0.101) (0.096) (0.118) (1.000)
0.032 0.173
(0.030) (0.285)
First stage of 2SLS:
Effects on ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in current neighborhood of residence):
0.038** 0.031** 0.026** 0.039** 0.031** 0.031** 0.027** 0.028** 0.022* 0.033** 0.028** 0.028**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
-0.078† -0.156**-0.151**-0.154** -0.155**-0.157** -0.079 -0.166**-0.164** -0.143† -0.163** -0.163**
(0.044) (0.048) (0.057) (0.055) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.055) (0.062) (0.081) (0.055) (0.055)
Effects on ln(pct. non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in neighborhood of residence):
0.202** 0.202** 0.166** 0.164** 0.165** 0.124**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
0.069** 0.072**
(0.016) (0.016)
Ln(employment rate of non-Westerm immigrant 
men aged 18-60)
Ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant 
men aged 18-60 living in assigned neighborh.)
Panel B: 2SLS estimates of characteristics of current neighborhood of residence
Ln(employment rate of non-western immigrant 
men aged 18-60)
Ln(pct. non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60)
Ln(employment rate of non-Westerm immigrant 
men aged 18-60)*ln(pct. non-Western immigrant 
men aged 18-60)
Ln(employment rate of non-Westerm immig. men 
aged 18-60)*ln(pct. non-Western immig. men 
aged 18-60)
Table 10: OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence) 
on individual labor market outcomes. Balanced panel of male refugees: YSM=2-6. 
Employed in Nov.
All All
Ln(employment rate of non-Westerm immig. Men 
in assigned neighborhood)*ln(pct. non-Western 
immig. men in assigned neighborh.)













Effect on ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant men in neighborhood)*ln(pct. non-Western immigrant men in neighborhood):
Ln(pct. non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 
in assigned neighborhood)
No other non-Western immigrant men aged 18-
60 in assigned neighborhood
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Controls for area of assignment:
Socio-economic and demographic municipality 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality of assignment FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 34,360 42,820 10,595 14,130
Number of individuals 6,872 8,564 3,849 5,015
Source : Administrative registers from Statistics Denmark.
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05, †: P<0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls: individual random effect, age and age squared, indicators for marital status,
having a child aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17, educational attainment, YSM, year of immigration and country of origin, municipality of assignment and socioeconomic municipality
characteristics (log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross income), log(pct. non-Western immigrants) and log(pct. co-nationals)). Values of control variables are
measured in the year of assignment. Ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration) has a mean










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0.009** 0.008** 0.007** 0.009** 0.010** 0.008** 0.057** 0.055** 0.051** 0.058** 0.059** 0.055**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.007** -0.019** -0.015 -0.059**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009)
0.005** 0.007
(0.002) (0.011)
0.011 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.437** 0.407** 0.316 0.289* 0.528* 0.419*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.150) (0.154) (0.232) (0.144) (0.259) (0.202)
0.012 0.003 0.449† -0.452
(0.021) (0.027) (0.234) (0.518)
0.022 -0.006
(0.044) (0.510)
First stage of 2SLS:
Effects on ln(employment rate of co-national men living in current neighborhood of residence):
0.030** 0.028** 0.021† 0.035** 0.024** 0.027** 0.017† 0.014 0.002 0.027* 0.011 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004)
-0.424** -0.451** -0.481** -0.431** -0.315**-0.456**-0.297**-0.310** -0.284* -0.321** -0.198* -0.081**
(0.073) (0.068) (0.081) (0.081) (0.068) (0.067) (0.079) (0.083) (0.120) (0.092) (0.090) (0.030)
Effects on instruments on ln(pct. co-national men living in current neighborhood of residence):
0.110** 0.111** 0.067** 0.068**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.019) (0.018)
Effect on ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in current neighborhood of residence):
0.029** 0.026**
(0.005) (0.005)
Table 11: OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of ln(employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence) on individual 
labor market outcomes. Balanced panel of male refugees: YSM=2-6. 
Dependent variable:
Ln(employment rate of co-national men aged 18-
60)
Ln(employment rate of co-national men aged 18-
60)
Employed in Nov. Ln(real annual earnings)
Panel A: OLS estimates of chacteristics of current neighborhood of residence






Ln(pct. co-national men aged 18-60) (2SLS)
Ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant 
men aged 18-60)
Ln(employment rate of co-national men aged 18-





Ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant 
men aged 18-60)
Ln(pct. co-national men aged 18-60)
All
No co-national men aged 18-60 in assigned 
neighborhood
Ln(pct. co-national men aged 18-60 living in 
assigned neighborhood)
Ln(employment rate of non-Western immig. men 
aged 18-60 living in assigned neighbourh.)
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Controls for area of assignment:
Socio-economic and demographic municipality 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality of assignment FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 34,360 42,820 10,595 14,130
Number of individuals 6,872 8,564 3,849 5,015
Source : Administrative registers from Statistics Denmark.
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05, †: P<0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls: individual random effect, age and age squared, indicators for marital status,
having a child aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17, educational attainment, YSM, year of immigration and country of origin and socioeconomic municipality characteristics
(log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross income), log(pct. non-Western immigrants) and log(pct. co-nationals)). Values of control variables are measured in the year of
assignment. Ln(employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration) has a mean (std. dev.) of 0.68 (3.89), ln(pct. co-
national men aged 18-60 living in neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after assignment) has a mean (std. dev.): 0.014 (1.37) and ln(employment rate of non-Western immigrant men










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Current neighborhood of residence:
Socially deprived 0.025 0.348
(0.028) (0.215)
Ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60) -0.007 -0.504
(0.048) (0.415)
0.100* 0.083* 0.056 0.828* 0.795** -0.392
(0.045) (0.042) (0.055) (0.332) (0.303) (0.809)
-0.022† -0.090
(0.013) (0.121)
0.010 0.007 0.003 0.343* 0.527* 0.452
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.139) (0.258) (0.280)
Ln(pct. co-national men aged 18-60) 0.003 -0.450
(0.027) (0.518)
Controls for area of assignment:
Socio-economic and demographic 
municipality characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality of assignment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations
Number of individuals
Source : Administrative registers from Statistics Denmark.
Ln(pct. non-Western immigrant men aged 
18-60)
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05, †: P<0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls: individual random effect, age and age squared, indicators for marital status,
having a child aged 0-2, having a child aged 3-17, educational attainment, YSM, year of immigration and country of origin and socioeconomic municipality characteristics
(log(inhabitants), unemployment rate, log(average gross income), log(pct. non-Western immigrants) and log(pct. co-nationals)). Values of control variables are measured in the year of 
assignment. Ln(employment rate of men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration) has a mean (std. dev.) of 4.22 (0.234), ln(employment rate of
non-Western immigrant men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration) has a mean (std. dev.) of 3.47 (1.048), ln(pct. non-Western immigrant
men aged 18-60 living in the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration) has a mean (std. dev.) of 1.97 (1.19), ln(employment rate of co-national men aged 18-60 living in
the neighborhood of residence 2-6 years after immigration) has a mean (std. dev.) of 0.68 (3.89) and ln(pct. co-national men aged 18-60 living in neighborhood of residence 2-6 years
after immigration) has a mean (std. dev.): 0.014 (1.37).
Table 12: 2SLS estimates of characteristics of current neighborhood of residence on individual labor market outcomes. Balanced panel of male refugees: 
YSM=2-6. Refugees assigned to Copenhagen or Frederiksberg municipality are excluded.
Dependent variable:
Employed in Nov. Ln(real annual earnings)
Ln(employment rate of co-national men 
aged 18-60)
7,941
Ln(employment rate of non-Western 










Age 30.65 32.13 30.35
(11.14) (12.89) (10.73)
Married 0.476 0.523 0.467
(0.500) (0.500) (0.499)
Having a child aged 0-2 0.113 0.123 0.111
(0.317)  (0.328) (0.314)
Having a child aged 3-17 0.188 0.231 0.179
(0.390) (0.422) (0.383)
Educational attainment:
0-9 years of education 0.12 0.126 0.119
(0.325)  (0.332)  (0.324)
10-12 years of education 0.39 0.375 0.392
 (0.488) (0.484) (0.488)
More than 12 years of education 0.166 0.169 0.165
(0.372) (0.375) (0.372)
Unknown education 0.325 0.33 0.324
 (0.469) (0.470) (0.468)
Year of immigration 1991 1992 1991 
(3.99) (3.72) (4.01)
Country of origin:
Iran 0.151 0.134 0.155
(0.358) (0.341) (0.362)
Iraq 0.237 0.286 0.227
 (0.425)  (0.452) (0.419)
Vietnam 0.073 0.114 0.065
(0.300) (0.318) (0.246)
Sri Lanka 0.135 0.046 0.155
(0.342) (0.208)  (0.362)
No citizenship 0.203 0.168 0.211
 (0.403) (0.374) (0.408)
Ethiopia 0.008 0.007 0.008
 (0.086) (0.083) (0.087)
Afghanistan 0.038 0.045 0.037
(0.192)  (0.207)  (0.189)







Table A1.A: Mean (standard deviation) of personal attributes and area characteristics in 





Socially deprived neighborhood 0.167 1 0 
(0.361)








Pct. co-national men aged 18-60 0.92 2.81 0.54
 (1.72) (2.98) (0.96)
Municipality characteristics:
Ln(inhabitants) 10.89 11.83 10.70 
(1.31) (0.89) (1.30)
Unemployment rate 9.85 11.22 9.58 
(2.97) (2.45) (2.99)
Ln(average gross income) 12.18 12.16 12.18 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
Pct. non-Western immigrants 3.19 4.57 2.92 
(2.57) (2.66) (2.46)
Pct. co-nationals 0.18 0.28 0.16
(0.20) (0.22) (0.20)
Housing characteristics:
Private rental 0.417 0.122 0.456
(0.493) (0.327) (0.500)
Public rental 0.328 0.814 0.231
(0.470) (0.389) (0.422)
Unknown rental type 0.255 0.064 0.293
(0.436) (0.244) (0.455)
One-family house 0.179 0.003 0.215
(0.384) (0.056) (0.411)
Row house 0.071 0.04 0.077
(0.256) (0.195) (0.266)
Apartment 0.492 0.876 0.415
(0.500) (0.329) (0.493)
Dormitory 0.032 0.052 0.027
(0.175)  (0.222) (0.163)
Other housing type 0.021 0 0.025
 (0.142) (0.156)
N 15,436 2,573 12,863
Source:  Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark.
Employment rate of co-national men aged 18-
60
Table A1.B: Mean (standard deviation) of personal attributes and area characteristics in 






Employment rate of non-Western immigrant 
men aged 18-60














1 2 3 4 5 6
Personal attributes in year t:
Years of education (ref. cat.: 0-9 years):
10-12 years 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.022 0.024
(0.010) (0.006) (0.058) (0.041)  (0.130) (0.051)
More than 12 years -0.015 0.01 -0.015 -0.097 -0.15 -0.069
(0.012)  (0.009) (0.072)  (0.060) (0.206) (0.067)
Age 0.0006 -0.0004 0.002 0.005** 0.021** 0.009**
(0.0004)  (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002)
Married 0.001 -0.0004 0.034 -0.003 -0.155 -0.001
 (0.011)  (0.005) (0.045) (0.041) (0.110)  (0.051)
Child aged 0-2 0.004 0.007 -0.09 -0.139** 0.1 -0.112
(0.011) (0.005) (0.075) (0.048) (0.129)  (0.063)
Child aged 3-17 0.026** -0.003 -0.049 -0.053* -0.348* -0.094
(0.010) (0.009) (0.048)  (0.071) (0.148) (0.078)
R2 0.035 0.106 0.03 0.1245 0.092 0.237
N
Source:  Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark.
Dependent variable: Neighborhood of assignment characteristics
15,436
Note: **: P<0.01, *: P<0.05. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls: Dummies for country of origin, year of immigration and missing information about
educational attainment.
Table A2: Location assignment of individuals in balanced sample of refugee men.
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Source:  Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark.
Moved out of:
15,436
Table A3: Share of individuals who have moved out of the neighborhood of assignment and 
municipality of assignment. Balanced sample of refugee men.
59
All All
Socially deprived Non-deprived Socially deprived Non-deprived
1 2 3 4 5 6
YSM=1 0.049 0.036 0.051 9.64 9.48 9.66
(0.215) (0.187) (0.22) (1.7) (1.81) (1.68)
N 15,436 2,573 12,863 1,556 197 1,359
YSM=2 0.121 0.091 0.127 10.36 10.21 10.38
(0.326) (0.288) (0.333)  (1.54)  (1.63)  (1.53)
N 15,436 2,573 12,863 3,321 412 2,909
YSM=3 0.19 0.158 0.197 10.66 10.47 10.69
(0.393) (0.365) (0.398) (1.53) (1.61)  (1.52)
N 15,436 2,573 12,863 4,605 638 3,967
YSM=4 0.239 0.207 0.245 10.85 10.8 10.85
(0.427) (0.405) (0.43) (1.51) (1.55)  (1.51)
N 15,436 2,573 12,863 5,177 717 4,460
YSM=5 0.274 0.259 0.277 10.93 10.91 10.93
(0.446) (0.438) (0.447) (1.50) (1.62) (1.48)
N 15,436 2,573 12,863 5,646 821 4,825
YSM=6 0.306 0.288 0.31 11.04 11 11.05
(0.461) (0.453) (0.463)  (1.46) (1.50) (1.45)
N 15,436 2,573 12,863 5,976 889 5,087
Source:  Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark.
Note: Annual earnings are deflated using the consumer price index with base year 2000. For comparison, in 2000 84% of men aged 20-59 in Denmark was employed
(www.Statistikbanken.dk/RASA and www.Statistikbanken.dk/BEF5) and the average annual earnings of male workers in Denmark were DKK 238,294
(www.Statistikbanken.dk/INDKP1).
Dependent variable:
Neighborhood of assignment: Neighborhood of assignment:
Table A4: Mean (standard deviation) of dependent variables by years since migration (YSM). Balanced sample of refugee men.
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